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CASES NOTED
themselves by misusing confidential information. Public confidence, it
should be remembered, is essential to lending agencies. 27  Since statutory
prohibition 28 against loan officers taking fees, gifts, or making unsound in-
vestments21 1 serves to protect banks against unconscionable acts by their offi-
cials, it seems that the courts should make them quasi-agents of the appli-
cants dealing with the banks or in sonic other way establish a fiduciary rela-
tionship between them in every such case. The present decision could also
serve as authority for requiring officials of banks other than co-operative
banks, indeed of any lending agency that necessarily, because of statutory
requirement or otherwise, acquires confidential information regarding the
contemplated purchase, to deal honorably with those whose confidence they
hold, and to use the information only for its intended purpose.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-WIFE'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS
OF CONSORTIUM DUE TO NEGLIGENT INJURY TO HUSBAND
Because of defendant employer's negligence, plaintiff's husband was
injured, suffering severe and permanent injuries to his body, as a consequence
of which plaintiff was deprived of his aid, assistance and enjoyment, spe-
cifically sexual relations. Plaintiff's husband received compensation for his
injuries pursuant to the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act,' which provides2 exclusive liability for employers.
Plaintiff brought action against defendant to recover for loss of consortium.
Trial court entered a judgment for defendant, on motion that the court
lacked jurisdiction and the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Held,
on appeal, judgment reversed for plaintiff; a wife has a cause of action for
loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her husband. Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 71 S.Ct. 81
(1950).
Prior to the announcement of this decision, there was unanimity of
authority denying the wife a cause of action in these premises.3 On the
27. Lowell Co-operative Bank v. Co-operative Central Bank, supra note 26.
28. ANN. LAWS OF MASS. C. 170 § 43.
29. Greenfield Savings Bank v. Abercrombie, supra note 26.
1. 44 STAT. 1424 et seq., 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1946).
2. 44 STAT. 1426, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1946).
3. E.g., Tyler v. Brown-Service Funeral Homes Co., 250 Ala. 295, 34 So.2d 203
(1948): Sobolewski v. German, 32 Del. 540, 127 Atl. 49 (1924); Cravens v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192,
104 Aft. 538 (1918); Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916); Nash v.
Mobile & Ohio R.R., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928); Tobiassen v. Polley, 96 N.J.L.
66, 114 Atl. 153 (1921); Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct.
1945); Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y. Supp. 534 (2d Dep't 1934).
Only one court ever had allowed the action, Hipp v. E. 1. duPont de' Nemours & Co,
182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921), and that court subsequently effectively reversed its
position, Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925);
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other hand, courts have experienced no difficulty in permitting the husband
to recover for loss of consortium due to an injury to the wife, whether in-
tentional 4 or unintentional.5 The wife, too, has been permitted to recover
for loss of consortium due to an intentional injury to the husband, and in
cases involving direct attacks on the matrimonial relation, such as aliena-
tion of affections7 and criminal conversation.8  It is, then, only in the field
of non-intentional, or negligent, injuries to the husband that the wife is
universally denied relief for loss of consortium,9 a line of demarcation vigor-
ously denounced in this court's well-reasoned opinion.
The universal rule has been condemned by nearly all legal writers.'
This is not surprising, when considered in the light of the rationalizations
akin to legal acrobatics indulged in by the courts to sustain their adherence
to this rule." A favorite premise upon which relief to the wife is denied is
that, although consortium abstractly includes such elements as love, sexual
relations, felicity and companionship, the essential compensable element
in a negligent invasion is loss of material services.1 2 This premise, founded
as it is on an arbitrary and fictitious separation of the various elements of
consortium,13 serves only to circumvent the logic of allowing the wife such
an action. Indeed, the conclusions reached by courts of different jurisdic-
tions, after adopting this erroneous premise, have accomplished noticeably
variant results." Other courts, proceeding on the rationale that elements
McDaniel v. Trent Mills, 197 N.C. 342, 148 S.E. 440 (1929); lelmstetler v. Duke
Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945), except that in its jurisdiction today the
wife's action may be maintained to recover actual expenses incurred by her own estate
in caring for the husband, McDaniel v. Trent Mills, supra.
4. Berger v. Jacobs, 21 Mich. 215 (1870); 1Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202 (N.Y.
1867).
5. Commercial Carriers, Inc., v. Small, 277 Ky. 189, 126 S.W.2d 143 (1939);
Skoglund v. Minneapolis Street Ry., 45 Minn. 330, 47 N.W. 1071 (1891); Matteson v.
N.Y. Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 487 (1866).
6. Clark v. Hill, 69 Mo.App. 541 (1897); Flandernneyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St.
327, 98 N.E. 102 (1912); Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917).
7. Hidima v. ludyma, 131 Conn. 281, 39 A.2d 890 (1944); Dietzman v. Mullin,
108 Ky. 610, 57 S.W. 247 (1900).
8. Turner v. Ileavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 206 S.\. 23 (1918); Woodman v. Goodrich,
234 Vis. 565, 291 N.V. 768 (1940).
9. See note 3 supra.
10. See PROSSER, TORTS, 948 (1941); IHARPER, TORTS, 566 (1933); Holbrook,
The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MiC. L. Rav. I (1923); Lippman, The
Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COL. L. REv. 651 (1930).
I1. E.g., Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry., 172 Mo.App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019
(1913?; Shcard v. Oregon Elec. Ry., 137 Ore. 341, 2 P.2d 916 (1931). Compare Clark
v. Hil, supra note 6, with Gambino v. Mfgrs'. Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo.App. 653,
158 S.W. 77 (1913).
12. E.g., Marri v. Stamford Stret R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582 (1911).
13. Lippman, supra note 10, at 667, 668.
14. Compare Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933), Brown
v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912), Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry.,
supra note 11, with Marri v. Stamford Street R.R., supra note 12, Bolger v. Boston
Elevated R.R., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910), Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187,
236 N.W. 222 (1931), lHelmstetler v. Duke Power So., supra note 3, and with Giggey
v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937), Eschenback v. Benjamin,
195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935), Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462
(1919), Gambino v. Mfgrs'. Coal & Coke Co., supra note 11.
CASES NOTED
of the consortium, other than that of material services, are injured in negli-
gent invasions, nevertheless on one or more of several grounds have denied
recovery to the wife.," None of these grounds have any real validity. Still
other equally untenable grounds have been relied on by some courts16 in
these actions. The utter inconsistency of the courts is manifested by the
position taken that the wife may recover for an intentional or so-called
malicious injury to the consortium, 17 but may not recover for an identical
injury caused by negligence. There is no good reason for allowing relief
for an injury to a legally protected interest in the one case while denying it in
the other, but courts have attempted to rationalize this departure from
proper legal principles by an argument which is elementarily unsound.18
It may be too optimistic to hope that stare decisis will give way in the
face of this court's exhaustive, albeit devastating, treatment of the universal
rule and the policy behind it. Yet it is much to be desired that the pre-
vailing view be discarded, since there is neither logic nor fairness to support
it. Certainly other jurisdictions conceivably could profit by an awareness
of an historic decision delivered by a court unafraid of its duty to dispense
justice. The language of this court' may well be regarded as an important
legal guidepost: ". . . we are not unaware of the unanimity of authority
elsewhere denying the wife recovery under these circumstances . . . after
piercing the thin veils of reasoning employed to sustain the rule, we have
been unable to disclose any substantial rationale on which we would be
willing to predicate a denial of a wife's action for loss of consortium due
to a negligent injury to her husband."
FEDERAL COURTS - EFFECT OF STATE
DECISIONS IN NON-DIVERSITY CASES
Action was started in the federal court to recover the balance due a
widow from National Service Life Insurance covering deceased. Recovery
depended on a determination of whether claimant was the legal widow of
the deceased. Claimant-wife and deceased were divorced from their former
15. Wife's injury not direct, McDade v. West, 80 Ga.App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299
1949); Brown v. Kistleman, supra note 14; Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y.
upp. 459 (Sup.Ct. 1900); Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 81 Ore. 517,
160 Pac. 132 (1916). Wife's injuries too remote and consequential, Gambino v. Mfgrs'.
Coal & Coke Co., supra note 11; Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry. supra note 1I. No re-
covery allowed at common law for sentimental elements of consortium, Feneff v. N.Y.
Cent. & H. R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909). Wife cannot show loss of services,
Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, sujna note 14; Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101
112 N.E. 204 (1915).
16. Wife's interest in marital relation not a property right, Brown v. Kistleman,
supra note 14; Goldman v. Cohen, supra note 15.
17. See supra, notes 6, 7, 8.
18. Wife's action allowed to punish defendant, Brown v. Kistleman, supra note 14;
Goldman v. Cohen, supra note 15; Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., supra
note 15. If cause of action based entirely on punitive damages, action fails, McCoRMIcKC,
DAMAGES, § 83, (1935).
19. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
